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Against a background of extensive literature examining how digital platforms are regulated
through ‘soft’ mechanisms, this paper analyses the ‘hard law’ techniques, such as sanc-
tions, which are also very much used on digital platforms to police undesirable behaviours.
It illustrates the use of these sanctions, suggesting that it is possible to find three different
categories of sanctions: sanctions that find their source in hard (international and domes-
tic) law, sanctions that find their source in digital platforms’ own normative production,
and sanctions used in the course of disputes. Platform operators can have an intense
power of norm-setting and sanctions, with a tendency to concentrate power within them-
selves or with unclear arrangements for dividing it across different entities. This can deeply
affect individual freedoms. This paper suggests that the ways in which the power to set,
decide and enforce sanctions is exercised in the digital space transform the public–private
divide: the allocation of roles between sovereign public bodies and free private actors is
reshaped to become ‘hybrid’ when it comes to enforcing rules and monitoring compliance
through a wide range of sanctions on digital platforms. This paper frames the legitimacy
questions arising from sanctions and suggests that the public–private divide may have to be
bridged in order to locate a possible source of legitimacy. A future framework for assessing
how platform operators set norms and ensure compliance through sanctions needs to start
from individual users to see how best to protect their freedom when checks and balances
around platforms’ powers and sanctions are developed. These individual users are the ones
who suffer from the economic, social and reputational consequences of sanctions in both
the digital world and the physical world.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The internet is the modern form of the ‘new world’, a place where the rules of the
game are in the process of being defined. A key question is: who is setting these
rules and who is in a position to enforce them; hence, who can impose sanctions on
offenders? The uncertainty pertaining to answering these questions is reinforced by
the transnational and international dimensions of the internet.
* We gratefully acknowledge the discussions at the 8th Annual Conference of International
Law, Cambridge (20–21 March 2019); the generous comments offered by Professor Benedict
Kingsbury and Thomas Streinz; and the two anonymous referees who have opened new avenues
for reflection in our work.
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In 1996 John Barlow argued in favour of the withdrawal of States from this newly
created space and of giving the internet space the right to self-determination.1 This
approach was acknowledged by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/183
and the Tunis Agenda,2 which called for convening an annual multi-stakeholder meet-
ing: the so-called ‘Internet Governance Forum’. However, the Forum does not have any
decision-making power and is merely a place for sharing information about cyberspace.
Since then, discussions on the ‘soft teeth’ of the law in cyberspace have been at the fore-
front of legal scholarship.3 Research has so far focused on norm-setting in the digital
sphere, leaving sanctions little charted. Facing this literature gap, this paper explores
the ‘digital legal order’ through positivist lenses. It takes sanctions as indicative of the
authority exercised by platform operators in the digital space.
The lack of consensus on the rules applying in the digital sphere is compounded by
the fact that full digitalisation does not exist: there is no full extra-territorialisation of
digital interactions. They are never completely disconnected from a physical anchor in
the concrete world. However, the actual link between online activities and the physical
world can be legally complex. Bad behaviours can have a partial source in the physical
world when they relate to physical objects, spaces or pictures of real objects. They can
also lead to actual sanctions in the physical world, for instance in the form of fines. In
between, operators (ie the economic actors running the platforms) may design a whole
set of rules to regulate behaviour on digital platforms (ie the technical interface
between agents). Operators can act as a transmission belt for sanctioning behaviours
that others have deemed illegal. They can enforce their own understanding of what
acceptable behaviour online is. They can mitigate conflicts that arise between users
on platforms.
This paper analyses different strategies and roles that operators have developed to
police platforms. In doing so, it mainly investigates how powers are allocated between
public entities and private entities. This question of power allocation has two facets.
On the one hand, modern notions of sovereignty imply that public authorities are
sovereign in the sense that they have the authority to set norms and to apply sanctions
when these norms are infringed. Private actors have to comply with these norms, yet
sanctions can only be imposed following due process so that individual freedom is not
arbitrarily encroached upon. On the other hand, the principle of power separation
means that the same entity should not concentrate powers, ie that one single entity
should not exercise the functions of rule-making (or norm-setting) and rule implemen-
tation and enforcement (most notably through sanctions).4 This leaves open a range of
possible modalities for organising the allocation of powers between public and private
actors in the digital space.
1. See John Perry Barlow, ‘A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’ (Davos,
Switzerland, 8 February 1996) <https://www.eff.org/fr/cyberspace-independence> accessed 22
July 2019.
2. See the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, accessible at <itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/
tunis/off/6rev1.html> accessed 22 July 2019.
3. Luca Belli, De la Gouvernance à la Régulation de l’Internet (Berger-Levrault, Boulogne-
Billancourt 2016); Dimitrios Koukiadis, Reconstituting Internet Normativity: The Role of State,
Private Actors, Global Online Community in the Production of Legal Norms (Hart-Nomos,
Baden-Baden 2015); Chris Reed, Making Laws for Cyberspace (OUP, Oxford 2012).
4. For a critical discussion of this approach to power separation, see Bruce Ackermann,
‘Good Bye, Montesquieu’ in Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter Lindseth and Blake Emerson
(eds), Comparative Administrative Law (2nd edn, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham
2017) 38.
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This paper aims to analyse these modalities based on illustrations drawn mainly
from the practices used on the major digital platforms (Facebook, YouTube,
Airbnb, Uber, Yahoo!, etc.). It will argue that the transnational nature of digital plat-
forms calls for international public–private cooperation to address the hybridity in
enforcement regimes. This hybridity leads either to extending public–private participa-
tion in setting sanctions in the digital space or to setting up hybrid institutions to
address the excesses to which sovereign platforms may be exposed. This paper will
first analyse the types of sanctions imposed by platform operators (Section 2), before
assessing the legitimacy of sanctions in the digital space (Section 3). It will then suggest
alternative solutions (Section 4) before concluding (Section 5).
2 SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY PLATFORMS
Platform operators can impose sanctions in three different sets of circumstances. First,
they impose sanctions upon users because the law imposes responsibility directly on
them or because a judicial decision has made platform operators liable for enforcing
the law (Section 2.1). Second, they impose sanctions upon users following norms
that they have set (Section 2.2), and third, when they are called upon to adjudicate
disputes arising from online interactions between users (Section 2.3). This leads to
multiple layers of sanctions imposed by platforms (Section 2.4).
In each of these cases, a similar structure has to be in place: a norm identifies an
inappropriate (or illegal) behaviour; powers are granted to an entity to monitor beha-
viour online or manage complaints; a procedure for this monitoring and manage-
ment has to be designed; a sanction is decided upon and then enforced. What
varies between the three sets of circumstances mentioned above is: (1) the role of
public authorities in predefining norms, inappropriate behaviour, processes and
sanctions; and (2) the correlative freedom of discretion enjoyed by platform opera-
tors in filling in the gaps in predefined norms, inappropriate behaviour, processes
and sanctions. Depending on their scope of discretion, platform operators may create
norms and act more or less as sovereign bodies identifying most aspects pertaining
to sanctions.
2.1 Legal grounds for platforms to enforce sanctions
States are materially unable to enforce their national laws against the multitude of
internet users.5 They have thus chosen to rely on internet intermediaries (internet
access providers, internet service providers, cloud storage providers and digital plat-
forms) to enforce their national laws in the digital world. States have made these inter-
mediaries liable for enforcing national laws in general and national decisions against
users’ behaviours6 in particular. This means that internet intermediaries have the
opportunity to impose sanctions (eg excluding people from a website or from certain
services) at the expense of misbehaving users.7 Case law illustrates these techniques
5. Reed (n 3) 49–54.
6. Marketa Trimble, ‘Extraterritorial Enforcement of National Laws in Connection with
Online Commercial Activity’ in John A Rothschild (ed), Research Handbook on Electronic
Commerce Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2016) 261, 271–279.
7. In the UK: Cartier Int’l AG v British Sky Broadcasting [2018] UKSC 28; in the USA:
Tiffany v eBay (see Irene Calboli, ‘Contributory Trademark Infringement on the Internet:
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and how the extra-territoriality of platforms tends to displace the boundary between the
public and private spheres.
One of the first decisions on the power conferred to platforms to impose a sanction
on users resulted from the Yahoo! v LICRA8 case. Yahoo! had created an auction
platform mainly for the American market, which was also accessible from the
French territory. On this platform, paraphernalia featuring Nazi symbols were sold.
A French association against anti-Semitism, and the French Alliance of Jewish
Students, introduced a complaint against Yahoo! for promoting Nazism. They
requested the judge to suspend Yahoo!’s activities promoting national socialism in
France and to remove listings of any Nazi memorabilia from the website. French leg-
islation made it a criminal offence to buy or even to display certain Nazi content.
Yahoo! argued it was technically impossible to prevent French users from accessing
the auction website for memorabilia. However, the court found that Yahoo! deemed
internet protocol (IP) localisation precise enough to use it for targeted advertising.
As Yahoo! had invested much money in developing such a precise tool for advertising,
the judge found that Yahoo! could not argue that the technological means for localisa-
tion were inefficient.9 Arguing otherwise would have required Yahoo! to recognise
that it was basically ‘throwing money out the window’. The judge thus held that
Yahoo! should remove the sections and listings pertaining to anti-Semitic items
from its website. As a consequence, Yahoo! barred all French users from this part
of the auctioning platform.
Abundant case law features litigation pertaining to the secondary (and injunctive)
liability of digital platforms for intellectual property infringements, a field where
most judicial challenges related to digital platforms have been made globally. In
terms of copyright, platforms have been made liable for the behaviour of another
party who is primarily infringing on intellectual property rights. Platforms are found
responsible because of their contributory or facilitative role in the primary infringe-
ment.10 The very nature of the platforms exacerbates copyright infringements – ie
in terms of their reach or the damage they cause. As operators are made liable for
copyright infringements by other users, they are incentivised to police more actively
and closely the contents of activities undertaken on their platforms. For instance,
the Megaupload founders were criminally convicted for the copyright infringements
Shouldn’t Intermediaries Finally Know What They Need to “Know” and “Control”?’ in John
A Rothschild (ed), Research Handbook on Electronic Commerce Law (Edward Elgar
Publishing, Cheltenham 2016) 211, 218–219).
8. Paris Trial court, Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme v Yahoo!, 20 November
2000; Yahoo! Inc. v La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme, 379 F 3d 1120 (9th Ct,
23 August 2004).
9. The experts at the time considered that ‘GPS’ localisation technology was not widespread
enough in computers and thus favoured focusing on the IP addresses. However, now, more than
8% of the population who own a mobile phone own a smartphone (which is a higher rate than
the 70% accuracy test for IP addresses, which was deemed sufficient by the French judge). See
Statista, ‘Penetration Rate of Smartphones Among Mobile Phone Users in France from 2014 to
2019’ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/764454/users-smartphone-phones-portable-la-france/
> accessed 22 July 2019. However, experts have found that the use of geolocalisation can affect
privacy more than the use of IP addresses does.
10. See eg Jaani Riordan, The Liability of Internet Intermediaries (OUP, Oxford 2016)
114–116.
Sanctions on digital platforms: beyond the public–private divide 261
© 2019 The Author Journal compilation © 2019 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
taking place on their website and the website was subsequently shut down because of
under-policing.11
Within the European Union (EU), the e-commerce directive shields platforms from
primary infringement liability and prohibits States from imposing a general monitoring
duty for the provision of information society services.12 A distinction needs to be
drawn depending on the role platforms play in facilitating illegal behaviour. In
some cases, platforms will remain passive, ie they do not play an active role in the mar-
keting of the products on offer. In these instances, the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) considers that platforms can be shielded from their primary liability.
However, ‘active’ platforms do not benefit from this potential exemption.13 In addi-
tion, the CJEU case law has extended the prohibition of the general monitoring
duty so as to prevent any legislation that requires platforms to implement a technical
means of systematically screening all content in order to proactively monitor intellec-
tual property infringements.14
In other instances, platforms index content that is infringing copyright regulations.
This may happen for the purpose of sharing it as widely as possible. According to the
CJEU, hyperlinking to infringing content does not constitute an infringement of the
intellectual property in itself, as this does not meet the criteria set by Article 3 of
the directive on copyrights in the information society (the so-called ‘InfoSoc direc-
tive’)15 on communicating content to the public.16 In yet more cases, platforms
have spread infringing content (films and music). In The Pirate Bay case, the CJEU
held that the platform’s indispensable role and its deliberate intervention meant that
it was liable for the primary infringement.17
While primary infringement is infrequent for digital platforms, secondary and
injunctive liability can happen in many circumstances. Article 14 of the e-commerce
directive compels an operator to take down content after being notified of its illegal
character, thus passing the sanction on to the user. In this case, Member States can
establish procedures to govern the removal or disabling of access to information.18
Within the legal framework set by Member States, operators may have to impose sanc-
tions to stop an illegal behaviour on their platforms. Operators act on behalf of the
Member States when they so police the behaviour of users on their ‘virtual’ space.
For these reasons, remaining a ‘passive’ intermediary has been at the centre of the
business structure of platforms. This has been an important legal challenge for
11. Ross Drath, ‘Hotfile, Megaupload, and the Future of Copyright on the Internet: What can
Cyberlockers Tell Us about DMCA Reform’ (2012) 12 John Marshall Review of Intellectual
Property Law 205.
12. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the
Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’), OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, 1–16.
13. CJEU, C-236/08, Google France v Louis Vuitton, 23 March 2010 (ECLI:EU:C:2010:159);
CJEU, C-324/09, L’Oréal v eBay, 12 July 2011 (ECLI:EU:C:2011:474).
14. CJEU, C-360/10, SABAM v Netlog, 16 February 2012 (ECLI:EU:C:2012:85).
15. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society,
OJ L 167, 22.6.2001, 10–19.
16. CJEU, C-466/12, Svensson v Retriever Sverige AB, 13 February 2014 (ECLI:EU:
C:2014:76). See also CJEU, C-160/15, GS Media v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV,
8 September 2016 (ECLI:EU:C:2016:644).
17. CJEU, C-610/15, Stichting Brein v Ziggo, 14 June 2017 (ECLI:EU:C:2017:456).
18. Art 14 (3) Directive on electronic commerce (n 12).
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platforms as there is no clear boundary for distinguishing a passive platform from an
active platform. However, legislation has increasingly supported (and pushed) plat-
forms to intervene and remove infringing content (hate speech, protected content).
In the past, eBay did not monitor the content on its platforms in terms of compliance
with intellectual property law because doing so would result in liability if they failed to
find an infringing product. However, eBay had its own internal notice-and-take-down
system for copyright holders.19 In early 2018, the European Commission settled this
matter when it adopted a recommendation on measures to tackle illegal content online
effectively:20 proactive monitoring does not affect the ‘passive’ role of platforms, sup-
porting the sanctioning power of platforms while keeping them shielded from liability.
In addition, the directive on copyright in the digital single market21 sets forward the
mechanism of ‘notice and stay down’, meaning that the copyright holder should
only signal the existence of infringing content, and any further replication of this con-
tent should be removed ipso facto (ie with the best efforts) by the platform (under
Article 17 of the directive).22 Within the US, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
1998 provides a similar mechanism of primarily liability shield and notice-and-take-
down procedures.23
Being passive means that platforms are only offering an electronic space where
other actors can make their transactions. In this case, platforms are in the position
of a laissez-faire type of body creating a collective space where users can make trans-
actions freely, provided that they act in accordance with State regulations. In contrast
to passive platforms, active platforms curate content, ie they either promote content or
have ‘police agents’ on that electronic space ensuring that the traffic occurs according
to the rulebook. Once platforms become active, they need to be extremely careful in
their deeds. Any action could make them run the risk of being liable themselves in
cases of mistakes with regard to claims related to freedom of expression or intellectual
property. Thus, in one case, platforms act as a quasi-public power (when they police
content) and, in the other case, they act as private actors (when they promote content
for advertisement purposes, for instance). This illustrates the ubiquity of roles that plat-
forms play in relation to their users in the digital space.
When platforms have knowledge of the infringing character of content put online,
they become active and have a legal duty to remove it and thus to sanction their
users.24 Platforms are actually a transmission belt for the enforcement of norms set
by public authorities. Their contribution to this enforcement is that they make compli-
ance with these norms more efficient and pervasive. Private actors behave as the
19. David Baron, ‘Private Ordering on the Internet: The eBay Community of Traders’ (2002) 4
Business and Politics 250.
20. Commission Recommendation of 1.3.2018 on measures to effectively tackle illegal content
online (C(2018) 1177 final).
21. Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019
on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market, OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, 92–125.
22. This article is controversial for the potentially chilling effect of the extensive power
granted to platforms. See Will Slauter, ‘Copyright and the News: The EU’s Attempt to Rein
in the Internet Giants May Backfire’, The Conversation <https://theconversation.com/
copyright-and-the-news-the-eus-attempt-to-rein-in-the-internet-giants-may-backfire-98952>
accessed 22 July 2019.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c).
24. OECD, The Role of Internet Intermediaries on Advancing Public Policy Objectives
(OECD Publishing, Paris 2011) 143–149.
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‘armed face’ of the public authorities in the digital space, to avoid being themselves
sanctioned in the physical world.
2.2 Contractual ordering
Besides these sanctions for breaching domestic/EU/international law, platform
operators have also developed their own systems, setting the norms applicable on
their platforms, and distinguishing acceptable social behaviours from problematic
social behaviours on the platform. They operate this norm-setting mainly through
contractual agreements.25 They set a code of behaviour for the interactions among
users on the platform and for the relationships between these users and themselves,
the operators. In a second step, platform operators monitor how their users respect
these norms and codes. They implement and enforce the rules that they have set out
in their contractual agreements. Either compliance with the code ensues or sanctions
will be imposed on offenders. Depending on the problematic behaviour, the sanction
may be limited (eg blocking a picture or a(n) operation/transaction) or it can be more
drastic (eg blocking the user for a longer period of time or even permanently). In the
physical world, these types of sanctions would often need to be clearly defined before-
hand and be subject to a due process or to the possibility of external review, as a user
would be restricted in her/his freedom or see some benefits resulting from her/his
social belonging being taken away.
In the first place, platform operators develop their platform code, ie the lens through
which the user will perceive her/his relationship with the platform, and thus the inter-
action options open to her/him. For instance, Amazon does not authorise contacting
providers directly through the platform before a purchase. Booking.com does not pro-
vide a direct mailing system to hotels, who could then make the reservation on their
side without paying Booking.com’s commission/intermediation fee. This reduces the
cost for users and increases the revenue for the platform. ListMinut (the Belgium-
based ‘TaskRabbit’) automatically filters any personal information (including email
address, last name and phone number) communicated before the transaction is con-
firmed so that the payment has to take place through the platform, which can then
get paid a brokerage commission. Allying both coding and monitoring, platform
operators also ensure that users comply with community guidelines and terms and con-
ditions, such as the interdiction of accepting any money outside of the platform. In
these cases, the code shapes interactions with the platform and the way rules are
enforced: a sanction can be either implicit (no way to deviate from the technical/design
norm) or explicit (eg removal of content).
Second, platform operators monitor the content provided online. Each platform
develops its own approach to monitoring content. For instance, Amazon can choose
the kind of content it offers. In 2000, Yahoo! could have chosen to monitor the content
offered on its auction platform and only allowed secondhand furniture sales, thus not
becoming active in the market segment of Nazi memorabilia sales.26 It could also have
included in its Terms of Services (ToS) that such pieces would not be admitted for auc-
tion. Facebook has large teams of employees reviewing pictures which users have
25. Luca Belli and Jamila Venturini, ‘Private Ordering and the Rise of Terms of Service as
Cyber-Regulation’ (2016) 5(4) Internet Policy Review 1.
26. Marc H Greenberg, ‘A Return to Lilliput: The LICRA v. Yahoo! – Case and the Regulation
of Online Content in the World Market’ (2003) 18 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1191,
1194ff.
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flagged as illegal or as not complying with the community guidelines.27 If inappropri-
ate, these employees will eventually remove them from the platform. This was for
instance the case with the removal of pictures of mothers breastfeeding, which led
to an outcry in many countries.28 TaskRabbit carries out checks on the backgrounds
of its service providers to ensure the highest standard of quality in its service provi-
sion.29 Uber has the power to unilaterally exclude drivers whose ratings are too low.
Most of the monitoring and enforcement initiatives that platform operators can
undertake have the character of ‘administrative’ sanctions, meaning that platforms
do not have to adjudicate, ie ‘pick a side’ between two parties who argue in dissimilar
ways. Sanctions are, rather, adopted unilaterally by platform operators in order to
ensure a certain level of discipline and to regulate interactions and social behaviour
on platforms. What is primarily at stake is that a norm (set by a public body or a plat-
form) has been infringed, not the rights of another user on the platform. Questions of
extra-territoriality may arise because links with specific jurisdictions can be difficult to
disentangle.30 Operators, users and norms set up by specific public authorities may fall
within different jurisdictions. A key question will be whether a public body can rely on
private actors to extend the reach of its sanctioning power. This may be more efficient
and needed in technological terms, yet it may lead to possible tensions between differ-
ent jurisdictions. How do platforms navigate this uncertainty? Do they develop their
own sanctioning systems as digital islands? Do they isolate themselves from the phy-
sical world thanks to their contractual regulation leading to a form of self-regulation?
How can the public–private interfaces between the physical and the digital worlds be
shaped? Are we witnessing a form of transnational hybrid needing its own rules of the
game? Is this something international law is called on to develop, and if so, how?
2.3 Platforms as quasi-judges
Platforms play also an intermediary role in solving conflicts. They behave as the ‘adju-
dicative arm’ of the sovereign. This closely relates to the debate on alternative dispute
resolution and in particular to arbitration in commercial and non-commercial matters.
Here, we understand the extension of platforms to judicial activities as an increase of
the ‘private’ sphere in which users are immersed as soon as they join a platform.
Beyond arbitration, some platforms impose a duty to mitigate conflict through them
first, and only later become the recipient of a formal claim against other users.31
27. See eg the documentary ‘The Cleaners’ (in German ‘Im Schatten der Netzwelt’) by Hans
Block and Moritz Riesewieck (2018).
28. See eg Glenda Cooper, ‘Why “Lactivists” are Milking Facebook’s Breastfeeding Ban’,
The Telegraph (London, 10 February 2012) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/face
book/9072201/Why-lactivists-are-milking-Facebooks-breastfeeding-ban.html> accessed
22 July 2019.
29. TaskRabbit, ‘How It Works’ <https://www.taskrabbit.com/how-it-works> accessed
21 September 2019 (‘Taskers undergo an extensive screening process before they can join
our community. Every Tasker must pass an identity check and is screened for criminal offenses.
This background check collects information from national, local, and sex offender databases’).
30. For issues with transnational sanctioning in the physical world, see Oswald Jansen,
‘Transnational Sanctioning in EU Law’ <https://unimaas.academia.edu/OswaldJansen>
accessed 22 July 2019.
31. Jorge Morais Carvalho and Joana Campos Carvalho, ‘Online Dispute Resolution Platform:
Making European Contract Law More Effective’ in Alberto de Franceschi (ed), European
Contract Law and the Digital Single Market (Intersentia, Cambridge 2016) 245; Rodrigo
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In many State judiciary systems, basic principles regulate adjudication, especially the
publicity of the applicable norms, processes and sanctions, the impartiality of the judge
and the right to be heard. The main objective is to foster trust in the system and legal
certainty, ending conflicts and ensuring life can go on peacefully. Platform operators
have developed their roles as ‘quasi-judges’ diversely and creatively. To some extent,
they attempt to recreate some of the conditions fostering similar trust on their plat-
forms. This paper reviews some of these systems to ponder whether platforms acting
as quasi-judges act as public bodies, and hence develop a specific blend of ‘publicness’
in their private ordering.
A first illustration can be taken from eBay. eBay’s customer support was involved
in resolving disputes amongst customers early on. After partnering with the University
of Massachusetts Amherst to externalise mediation services over claims on eBay’s rat-
ing system in 1999, eBay realised that many claims needed to have in-house support.
In 2003, eBay made a ‘smart move’ and developed an in-house online dispute resolu-
tion centre.32 Due to the large number of cases, most of the decision-making needed to
be automated.33 This automation was made possible because every exchange between
the parties (except the delivery of goods) could be traced back to the platform. In addi-
tion to this procedure, eBay decided to design solutions for the two most common
issues arising among users: item-related and unpaid item disputes. It decided to
offer solutions made by the parties themselves (amicably and consensually) before
involving more formal mediation and even arbitration by eBay and PayPal, which pro-
vided payment solutions on the eBay platform. By creating a filter and delaying the
moment when a human being intervenes, eBay and PayPal expected to deal with a
lower number of situations when intervention would be necessary. Three procedures
were specifically set up for unpaid items and item-related disputes but also with regard
to extortion in terms of rating and feedback-reputation, especially for high-value transac-
tions happening at a slow pace (egmotor vehicle sales). However, when having recourse to
these procedures, the rule of precedent does not apply. Rather, eBay preferred its dispute
resolution team to base its decisions on a ‘principle-based’ resolution, established ahead of
the issue. There is thus a form of top-down (rather than bottom-up) approach to decisions.
This tends to mirror the requirement that sanctions have to be based on a legal text identi-
fying behaviour and sanctions, as in classic criminal or administrative law.34
In addition, for some dispute resolution processes, especially with regard to
feedback-related disputes, the resolution is outsourced to reduce the bias that
users can believe the platform has. Yet the whole procedure goes through the plat-
form itself, which provides the interface and the structure for exchanges pertaining
to the issue. Hence the outsourced partner’s sole role is to provide a man-made
Momberg, ‘Standard Terms and Transparency in Online Contracts’ in Alberto de Franceschi
(ed), European Contract Law and the Digital Single Market (Intersentia, Cambridge 2016)
189; Lilian Edwards and Caroline Wilson, ‘Redress and Alternative Dispute Resolution in
EU Cross-Border E-Commerce Transactions’ (2007) 21(3) International Review of Law,
Computers & Technology 315, 323, 326. See also: Pablo Cortés, ‘Online Dispute Resolution
Services: A Selected Number of Case Studies’ (2014) 20(6) Computer and
Telecommunications Law Review 172.
32. Colin Rule, ‘Designing a Global Online Dispute Resolution System: Lessons Learned from
eBay’ (2017) 13 University of St. Thomas Law Journal 354, 354–355.
33. Ibid 356.
34. For a discussion of these matters, see Agne Andrijauskaitė, ‘Exploring the Penumbra of
Punishment under the ECHR’ (2020) New Journal of European Criminal Law (forthcoming).
Kindly provided by the author.
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decision.35 The underlying idea is that this system ensures the independence of dis-
pute resolution and reduces the liability risks for eBay. This also means that the pri-
vate platform operator delegates its quasi-judicial role to an external private party.
This creates an organic separation between the norm-setter and the adjudicator. This
also calls into question the financial and principled independence of this adjudicator
if the terms of the delegation are not made widely public.
EBay’s experience has paved the way for dispute resolution policies on more recent
platforms. However, dispute resolution centres on other platforms do not seem as
bound by principles, as is the case with eBay. Rather, witnesses have reported the
huge discretionary power that platform operators enjoy. For instance, Airbnb
Customer Service can choose without motivation whether and how much to refund
a guest or a host.36 Initially, Airbnb was reluctant to assume any role in disputes invol-
ving users and relied heavily upon the reputation system.37 However, it soon realised
that it should work on prevention by monitoring bad guests, and by better matching
users. Different issues may arise with Airbnb’s contracts: problems with damage
caused in accommodation, cancellation issues and fraud. Airbnb also deals with
non-contractual issues, such as conflicts with neighbours.
From a contractual perspective, Airbnb’s terms and conditions offer first a ‘host
guarantee’, which is not insurance per se and which requires hosts to clearly instruct
guests about the expected use of accommodation, the need to compensate for any
damage in the accommodation, and the need for evidence of expenses incurred to
cover the damage.38 This approach has led to much criticism, as fulfilling these con-
ditions is usually hard39 and the scope of the protection is unclear.40 The way in
which Airbnb deals with damage claims seems overall unfair for all (including
guests).41 Second, Airbnb’s terms and conditions provide last-minute cancellation
policies, which can be unclear. Some users have had to find alternative options at
the last moment, which is usually expensive without any support from Airbnb.
Airbnb refuses to refund users for the price difference but accepts, in certain
cases, covering it, eg when it is threatened with legal action42 or when publicised in
35. Rule (n 32) 364.
36. See eg Rupert Jones, ‘Airbnb Wrecks Travellers’ Holiday Plans as Battle with Cities
Intensifies’, The Guardian (London, 16 June 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/technol
ogy/2018/jun/16/airbnb-booking-cancelled-last-minute-holiday-wrecked> accessed 22 July
2019.
37. Ethan Katsh and Orna Rabinovich-Einy, ‘Technology and Dispute Systems Design:
Lessons from the “Sharing Economy”’ (2015) 21 Dispute Resolution Magazine 11.
38. Airbnb, ‘Assurance Hôte’ <https://www.airbnb.com/host-protection-insurance> (FR)
accessed 22 July 2019. See also Ethan Katsh and Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Digital Justice:
Technolology and the Internet of Disputes (OUP, New York 2017) 71–75.
39. Anna Tims, ‘Why Does Airbnb’s Guarantee Make it so Difficult to Claim?’, The Guardian
(London, 3 October 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/money/2018/oct/03/airbnb-damage-
redress-guarantee> accessed 22 July 2019.
40. Ron Lieber, ‘A Liability Risk for Airbnb Hosts’, The New York Times (New York City,
5 December 2014) <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/06/your-money/airbnb-offers-home
owner-liability-coverage-but-hosts-still-have-risks.html> accessed 22 July 2019.
41. Patrick Collinson, ‘Why Did Airbnb Charge Me £1,500 for a Shattered Glass Door?’, The
Guardian (London, 28 August 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/money/2018/aug/28/
airbnb-damage-shower-property-bill> accessed 22 July 2019.
42. Patrick Collinson, ‘What Happens When Airbnb Goes Wrong?’, The Guardian (London,
4 August 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/04/what-happens-when-
airbnb-goes-wrong> accessed 22 July 2019.
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the media.43 Third, Airbnb’s policy addresses cases of fraud. Under certain conditions,
Airbnb agrees to refund users scammed after a false listing has been advertised on the
website44 and not been removed. Questions arise about the scope of this refund, espe-
cially when Airbnb knows that a listing misleads or scams users without reacting.
However, the burden of proof is heavy on the users.45
If eBay’s and Airbnb’s powers to develop a private legal order are undeniable under
contractual and economic freedom, what is rare is Airbnb’s potential to extend its poli-
cing to claims from non-members outside any statutory duty. Indeed, Airbnb’s role
extends beyond contractual claims. The management of externalities is usually a fea-
ture of public entities. For instance, Airbnb agrees to mediate conflicts arising with
neighbours who suffer from property rental. It has developed a tool enabling non-
Airbnb users to file an ‘extracontractual’ (tortuous) claim against guests.46 This tool
enables Airbnb to sanction guests for tarnishing Airbnb’s reputation when guests
cause inconvenience to neighbours, for instance by making noise or being dirty.
Indeed, Airbnb tries to develop a reputation for providing ‘good residents’ rather
than ‘troublemakers’ for idle rooms. Similarly, Airbnb has removed accounts of
users who engage in criminal activities (eg illegal short lets47 or sexual assaults by
guests).48 This can be seen as a clear sanction, akin to the removal of an illegal poster
put up on a street. In the physical world, the poster-hanger could ask for this removal
to be reviewed as it may encroach on her/his own individual rights if s/he has not been
43. Rebecca Smithers, ‘Airbnb Cancelled Our Booking … an Hour Before We Arrived’, The
Guardian (London, 30 April 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/apr/30/airbnb-
cancelled-booking-hour-before-arrived> accessed 22 July 2019; Miles Bringmall, ‘Airbnb Not
Very Accommodating When My Rental was Cancelled’, The Guardian (London,
19 September 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/sep/19/airbnb-not-accommo
dating-rental-cancelled> accessed 22 July 2019; Rebecca Smithers, ‘Airbnb’s Not-So-
Superhost’s Last-Minute Cancellation Cost Thousands’, The Guardian (London, 7 November
2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/nov/07/airbnb-last-minute-cancellation-cost-
thousands> accessed 22 July 2019. Contra: Anna Tims, ‘I’ve Been Ripped Off – Now HSBC
is Making it Hard For Me to Claim’, The Guardian (London, 31 March 2015) <https://www.the
guardian.com/money/2015/mar/31/ripped-off-hsbc-hard-to-claim> accessed 22 July 2019.
44. Anna Tims, ‘When is Airbnb Not Airbnb? When it Suddenly Turns into a Scam Email’,
The Guardian (London, 13 May 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/may/13/
when-is-airbnb-not-airbnb-when-it-suddenly-turns-into-a-scam-email> accessed 22 July 2019;
Rebecca Smithers, ‘Was Conned by a Fraudster Pretending to be an Airbnb Host’, The
Guardian (London, 8 May 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/may/08/conned-
by-fraudster-airbnb-host> accessed 22 July 2019.
45. Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy (n 38) 70–71.
46. Lara Williams, ‘When Airbnb Rentals Turn into Nuisance Neighbours’, The Guardian
(London, 18 September 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/17/airbnb-
nuisance-neighbours-tribunal-ruling> accessed 22 July 2019.
47. Rebecca Smithers, ‘We Arrived at Our Airbnb Booking on Singapore Only to Find it was
Illegal’, The Guardian (London, 2 October 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/
oct/02/airbnb-illegal-singapore-building-short-lets> accessed 22 July 2019; Miles Brignall,
‘Airbnb is Taking Bookings that Cannot be Fulfilled’, The Guardian (London, 6 June 2016)
<https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/jun/06/airbnb-bookings-berlin-law-rent-whole-
apartment> accessed 22 July 2019.
48. Ben Quinn, ‘Man Who Let Out Home on Airbnb for New Year Suffers £12,000 Damage’,
The Guardian (London, 9 January 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/
09/london-man-who-rented-home-out-for-new-year-airbnb-left-with-12000-damage> accessed
22 July 2019.
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given the opportunity to explain herself/himself. Yet, in the physical world, practical
issues with the identification of the poster-hanger would often make this a moot point.
Finally, Airbnb has also faced problems with dealing with user discrimination when
attempting to build trust amongst users by increasing the information available to hosts
and guests. Rather than excluding any liability of its own, Airbnb has accepted that it
should ex officio promote inclusion and develop a non-discrimination policy.49 Users
can complain on this basis, leading to discriminatory listings being removed.50 Here,
the role of the platform operator falls between an adjudicative measure taken to end a
conflict arising between users on the platform on the one hand, and a unilateral mea-
sure taken to police social behaviour on the platform on the other hand. This may,
however, result in platform operators engaging in a form of censorship.
2.4 Layers of sanctions
The second wave of digital platforms (‘Web 2.0’) eased access by laymen to the web
and increased the opportunity to exchange information between users and economic
operators. The platform structure of the Web 2.0 has quickly created heavily unba-
lanced market power, with the concentration of data and revenue streams in the
hands of the few. In order to limit access to information available online, States
have banned the use of social media at crisis times by compelling internet access pro-
viders who are anchored in the State’s territoriality to cut access to those services.51 In
doing so, the sanctions imposed by States on platforms percolate to the user level, as
they cannot access platform services anymore.
A multiplicity of actors has contributed to the emergence and shaping of the inter-
net, creating their own private legal orders. To sustain their power, platform operators
have assimilated sanctions from States’ legal orders while adding a layer of their own
making. This double coating has blurred the lines between public and private enforce-
ment mechanisms. What, then, is the legitimacy of these developments?
3 LEGITIMACY OF PLATFORMS’ DECISION-MAKING
Ensuring compliance, sanctioning misbehaviours and adjudicating disputes require
that rules are clearly established beforehand (Section 3.1), that sanctions are accepted
49. Airbnb, ‘Nondiscrimination Policy’ <https://www.airbnb.com/terms/nondiscrimination_
policy> (FR) accessed 22 July 2019. See also David Hoffman, ‘Relational Contracts of
Adhesion’ (2018) 85 University Chicago Law Review 1437.
50. Sam Levin, ‘Airbnb Adopts New Rules in Effort to Fight Racial Discrimination by Hosts’,
The Guardian (London, 8 September 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/
sep/08/airbnb-discrimination-policy-changes-racial-discrimination> accessed 26 July 2019.
51. See, eg, bans in Brazil: Natalia Scalzaretto and Caio Saad, ‘Facebook CEO Urges
Brazilians to Decry WhatsApp block’, Reuters (3 May 2016) <https://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/us-facebook-brazil-whatsapp-unblock/facebook-ceo-urges-brazilians-to-decry-whatsapp-
block-idUSKCN0XU1YY> accessed 22 July 2019; in Iran: Sheera Frenkel, ‘Iranian Authorities
Block Access to Social Media Tools’, The New York Times (New York City, 2 January 2018)
<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/technology/iran-protests-social-media.html> accessed
22 July 2019; and in Egypt: Charles Arthur, ‘Egypt Blocks Social Media Websites in
Attempted Clampdown on Unrest’, The Guardian (London, 26 January 2011) <https://www.the
guardian.com/world/2011/jan/26/egypt-blocks-social-media-websites> accessed 22 July 2019.
Sanctions on digital platforms: beyond the public–private divide 269
© 2019 The Author Journal compilation © 2019 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
as legitimate in democratic societies based on the rule of law (Section 3.2) and that
some kind of review exists in order to quash sanctions (Section 3.3).
3.1 Rule-making framing sanctions
The principle of sanctions needs to be established in some way, either because States
have set them up (Section 3.1.1) or because States have based them on the diligence of
platform operators (Section 3.1.2). The legitimacy of sanctions is assessed differently
depending on their sources.
3.1.1 States
In terms of public bodies’ rule-making, legitimacy issues can be of two kinds. On the
one hand, States can direct platforms to adopt some behaviours, and sanction them for
non-compliance. In this case, legitimacy questions are similar to legitimacy questions
regarding any legal rules, as in Hart’s rule of recognition52 or Ost’s tridimensional rule
of validity.53 Was the correct legislative procedure followed? Does the rule reflect the
values shared among the citizens of that State? These issues are common to any legal
rules, yet the need to understand the technological structures and issues arising from
online platforms means that specific expertise needs to be brought in within this
rule-making process.54 Furthermore, this question also concerns the issue of whether
the State adopting a given rule (and the principles for its sanction) is perceived by citi-
zens/consumers to have the authority (and understanding) needed in the given
situation.55
On the other hand, co-regulation between public and private entities has raised sev-
eral (limited) issues in terms of legitimacy. To the extent that States retain some form
of control over rule-making, their scrutiny legitimises the rule-making procedure.56
However, difficulties arise as soon as one tries to find the origin of a given rule:
does it come from a regulatory power delegated by a legislative act or is the act in
the realm of any free exercise of power by any economic actor? Such a situation
becomes self-regulatory in nature and does not benefit from the same legitimacy
grounds as acts originating from a State source.57
Indeed, purely self-regulatory mechanisms do not need to be as inclusive as a
State’s rules as third parties do not need to receive the same amount of consideration.
However, the risk is that the definition of stakeholders in co-regulation is too narrow or
overrepresents some sectorial interests.58 Legitimacy also depends on whether rules
are approved ex ante or ex post. If rules are approved by the State ex ante this covers
52. HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994) 100–110.
53. François Ost and Michel Van de Kerchove, De la Pyramide au Réseau: Pour une Théorie
Dialectique du Droit (FUSL, Brussels 2010).
54. For a discussion of expertise and formal rationality in rule-making at times of globalisa-
tion, see David Roth-Isigkeit, The Plurality Trilemma: A Geometry of Global Legal Thought
(Palgrave, Basingstoke 2018) 79–127.
55. Reed (n 3) 18–20.
56. Koukiadis (n 3) 72.
57. Ibid 78.
58. See eg Michèle Finck, ‘Digital Co-Regulation: Designing a Supranational Legal
Framework for the Platform Economy’ (2018) 43 European Law Review 47. See also CFI,
T-135/96, UEAPME v Council, 17 June 1998 (ECLI:EU:T:1998:128).
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any legitimacy claims for representation. Yet, if confirmation is ex post, this creates
room for (lengthy) discussions.59
3.1.2 Contracts
Contractual terms may be a legitimate means of deciding upon new rules between two
parties, and of policing behaviours requiring sanctions. Indeed, the theory held by pro-
ponents of regulation by perfectly competitive markets60 goes as follows: parties ben-
efit from the freedom to contract and to choose their contractual terms. This is deemed
to result in a fair agreement. However, in the absence of genuine contractual negotia-
tions (eg in the case of adhesion contracts), a source of legitimacy other than contrac-
tual choice needs to be established. This alternative source can be found in market
competition. A perfectly competitive market implies, then, that sellers have reputation
concerns if they disrespect users and that buyers have lower reputation concerns than
sellers. When sellers or users misbehave, the market/community creates a sanction by
diminishing/tarnishing reputation, which decreases opportunities for interactions and/
or increases opportunity costs.
In practice, however, electronic contracts are of an adhesive nature rather than a
negotiated one. Digital platforms do not work according to these assumptions about
competitive markets: platforms are not perfectly competitive but are rather an oligo-
poly (with only a handful of operators acting on the supply side). In turn, platform
operators do not have reputation concerns but users have very high reputation concerns
because of the rating systems. Therefore, users’ participation in the market cannot lead
to legitimising the applicable contractual terms and the rules that these terms cause to
arise.
Platform operators organise individuals’ lives and impose upon them terms which
are neither negotiated nor to which individuals are party.61 Users often do not even feel
compelled by the content of the rules or they refuse to be bound by them despite their
efforts to have them applied horizontally amongst users.62 These differences explain
why consenting to online ‘clickwrap agreements’ (ie digital shrink-wrap contracts)
is subject to extensive debates.63 One can distinguish situations between different
types of rules agreed in the digital space, especially community rules, ToS and privacy
policies – which can all set rules whose infringement by users may lead to the platform
eventually imposing sanctions on these users.
First, ToS and privacy policies contractually organise the relationship between a
platform operator and users without regard to third parties. These terms, as already sta-
ted, raise issues in terms of legitimacy because of their unilateral character. Studies
59. Christopher Marsden, Internet Co-Regulation: European Law, Regulatory Governance
and Legitimacy in Cyberspace (CUP, Cambridge 2011) 54.
60. Lucian Bebchuck and Richard Posner, ‘One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer
Markets’ (2006) 104 Michigan Law Review 827.
61. Luca Belli and Primavera De Filippi, ‘Law of the Cloud v Law of the Land: Challenges
and Opportunities for Innovation’ (2012) 3(2) European Journal of Law and Technology 1, 1ff.
62. In Gentry v eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 819 (2002), eBay attempted to force its users to
abide with certification measures (for collectible items) but tried to avoid being compelled to
undertake this certification enforcement.
63. In the US, Heather Daiza, ‘Wrap Contracts: How They can Work Better for Businesses and
Consumers’ (2018) 54 California Western Law Review 203. In Europe, Momberg (n 31).
Sanctions on digital platforms: beyond the public–private divide 271
© 2019 The Author Journal compilation © 2019 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
show that these contracts are barely read by users,64 and when they are, their techni-
cality65 or length66 make them difficult to comprehend. Part of the issue is that they are
not meant to be read, as indicated by their strict fine print format, whereas the rest of
the online environment is full of images and colours.67
Second, community rules are sometimes referred to as a ‘social contract’ that users
agree to comply with when they interact on a platform,68 although this contract is not
negotiated by users but established by platforms. These rules usually merely bind users
with other users, not the platform operator. In a true Social Contract à la Rousseau,
users should be the ones coming up with the terms of community rules and should
have participatory interests in the modification of these rules.69 They would freely
accept some restrictions to their freedom in return for social peace. Community
rules would be agreed upon to the benefit of the general interest only. In practice,
the interest represented in digital platforms’ community rules is often the one pursued
by the drafting party (the platform operator), rather than that of the whole community
of users. In certain circumstances, a platform can identify its own interest as being the
same as that of the platform users, eg good reputation hygiene for users will spill over
onto the platform’s reputation.70 In this case community guidelines can benefit from
the legitimacy of a social contract. However, these circumstances are more the excep-
tion than the rule: the social contract in the context of digital platform governance is
only of limited relevance in identifying the legitimacy of rules set out on platforms and
the subsequent sanctions imposed in cases of infringement.71
Once the legitimacy of the social contract is addressed, we can turn to the condi-
tions for legitimising the power entrusted to an entity when it exercises discipline.
This entity (either a sovereign or some superior authority—in practice a platform
operator or an entity designated by it) is required to build trust through technical
features (eg payment systems, ratings) but also thanks to discipline through penalties
to ensure compliance with the social contract. The legitimacy in using this disciplining
power pertains to the trust-building process on platforms. Mere neutrality of platform
operators is not enough, as it is difficult to know what this neutrality entails.
64. Jonathan Obar and Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, ‘The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring the
Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services’ (2018)
Information, Communication & Society 1.
65. Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler and David R Trossen, ‘Does Anyone Read the Fine
Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts’ (2014) 43 Journal of Legal Studies 1.
66. Aleecia McDonald and Lorrie Cranor, ‘The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies’ (2008) 4
Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 543.
67. See Nancy S Kim, ‘The Duty to Draft Reasonably and Online Contracts’ in Keith Rowley,
Larry A DiMatteo, Qi Zhou et al (eds), Commercial Contract Law: Transatlantic Perspectives
(CUP, Cambridge 2013) 180.
68. Przemyslaw J Palka, ‘Terms of Service are not Contracts: Beyond Contract Law in the
Regulation of Online Platforms’ in Stefan Grundmann (ed), European Contract Law in the
Digital Age, vol 3 (European Contract Law and Theory Intersentia, Cambridge/Antwerp/
Portland 2018) 136.
69. Rolf Weber, Shaping Internet Governance: Regulatory Challenges (Springer, Zurich
2010) 80–83.
70. David P Baron, ‘Private Ordering on the Internet: The eBay Community of Traders’ (2002)
4 Business and Politics 245.
71. Joni Salmien, Nicolas Gach and Valtteri Kaartemo, ‘Platform as a Social Contract: An
Analytical Framework for Studying Social Dynamics in Online Platforms’ in Anssi
Smedlund, Arto Lindblom and Lasse Mitronen (eds), Collaborative Value Co-Creation in the
Platform Economy (Springer, Singapore 2018) 43.
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For instance, should a platform foster freedom of information in the name of ‘non-
intervention’ or should it seek to protect users from disinformation?72 Users should
thus experience concretely that a platform is advancing/enforcing the social contract
to the benefit of the community of users.73 As a consequence, users will also make
the rules theirs. Otherwise users seek alternative rules which they find more legitimate.
They will exit a platform and conduct their interactions elsewhere in the digital space74
or they will challenge the rules judicially in the physical world. Here a lack of legiti-
macy in rule-setting may lead to users sanctioning platforms for failing to foster a
minimal amount of trust in them. A classic example of this type of user reaction is
the legal challenges by Uber drivers who find the rules (and the sanctions deriving
from them) to be illegitimate. The drivers thus seek to characterise their relationship
as a labour law contract with the platform, shifting away from being independent con-
tractors. Indeed, Uber wanted them to work as independent contractors in each contract
concluded with riders on each ride, as derived from the ‘framework contract’ initially
concluded by drivers with the platform.75 In contrast, in competitive markets (at least)
some actors try to develop more legitimacy to distinguish themselves and attract more
users to their platforms.
Alternatively, in Hoffman’s ‘relational contract of adhesion’,76 some sharing econ-
omy platforms reduce the number of liability waivers for platforms and could actually
be considered as creating legitimacy for sanction-making within adhesion contracts.
Indeed, a platform operator can also be found more liable and develop alternative stra-
tegies to become more legitimate: restricting liability waivers compels customer ser-
vices to establish a long-lasting relationship with their users through brand
alignment rather than through an adhesive contract.77
However, the unilateral character of ToS does not always have to be. For instance,
Facebook launched an inaugural vote in 2009 after a backlash against proposed
changes in its ToS. For the results of the vote to be valid, 30% of the existing commu-
nity needed to vote. In practice, auditors found that almost 80% of the community
expressed their voice.78 Any further amendment would be submitted to the same
rule. However, this fostered a very high turnout of comments with limited added
value. From 2012, Facebook changed its governance approach and only allowed for
comments on their amendment proposals. This move was meant to increase the quality
of feedback. This should in turn have had a beneficial effect on the sanctions included
in these ToS by providing sanctions which are more appropriate and better targeted in
cases of misbehaviour.
Another illustration of a social-contract-like situation is given by eBay. Indeed,
eBay merely enforces the terms of use after users try to sell fraudulent objects by
72. Ibid 61.
73. Ibid 52.
74. Per analogy to the ideas developed in Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge MA 1970).
75. Uber BV c Aslam [2018] EWCA Civ 2748. See also French Court of Cassation (the highest
court of the judicial order), Take Eat Easy, case nr 17-20.079, 28 November 2018.
76. According to Hoffman (n 49), the ‘relational contract of adhesion’ is an adhesion contract
which aims to establish long-term trust between parties and thus requires getting rid of abusive
terms in order to let trust grow.
77. Hoffman (n 49) 1452.
78. Lee A Bygrave, Internet Governance by Contract (OUP, Oxford 2015) 98; Facebook,
‘Facebook Site Governance’ <https://www.facebook.com/fbsitegovernance> accessed 22 July
2019.
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referring these users to the appropriate law enforcement agencies (despite eBay not
being defrauded itself). It leaves enforcement of the community’s principles to the
community itself through the reputation mechanism. Where the community and the
terms of service sides merge is when eBay suspends users with a too-bad rating (as
a consequence of not abiding with eBay’s contractual commitments for a given set
of transactions). In addition, eBay keeps track of users because users need to log in
with their credit cards to verify their identity and thus excludes users who try to parti-
cipate again with a different username (but with another credit card number for
instance, although the number of credit cards that any given individual can have is
rather limited and hence does not allow for a large number of accounts to be created).79
Finally, an important aspect of assessing the legitimacy of the contractual process of
rule-making is the clarity of the contractual scheme regulating transactions and beha-
viours on a platform. Many different contracts with several purposes often regulate
these transactions and behaviours. A user will be bound with the same platform opera-
tor with five, ten or sometimes even more contracts at the same time for a single trans-
action.80 For instance, users are bound on Uber with no fewer than 16 different legal
documents. In Brussels the contractual structure is even more complicated, so as to
comply with regulatory requirements.81
3.2 Legitimacy of sanctioning in se
The very fact of imposing sanctions in a given instance can be primarily grounded in
some form of State decisions (Section 3.2.1) or in platform operators’ discretion
(Section 3.2.2). Different legitimacy issues arise again, as is the case with general
frame-setting sanctions, as discussed in Section 3.1 above.
3.2.1 State decisions
When platforms apply a sanction to a user on grounds found in national (or European/
international) law, two situations can arise. First, as already mentioned, platforms
merely comply with a decision made by judicial bodies or government/executive agen-
cies. Two categories of decisions should be distinguished. On the one hand, a decision
may emanate from a country in which the party that needs to comply is a resident, a
national or has other close ties. In this case, the legitimacy of the sanction can be
assessed through rule of law criteria, such as whether the government is accountable,
whether the sanctioning procedure follows a fair process, and whether the punished
user has had an opportunity to be heard, appealed or get some judicial review. On
the other hand, a decision may emanate from a country with which the party that
needs to comply has limited ties. For instance, judges may require a platform operator
to abide with (foreign) rules, which raises legitimacy issues regarding the extraterritor-
ial application of a law. Two cases illustrate this point. In the Yahoo! case,82
79. Baron (n 70) 245–274.
80. Guido Noto La Diega, ‘Uber Law and Awareness by Design: An Empirical Study on
Online Platforms and Dehumanised Negotiations’ (2015) 2015(2) European Journal of
Consumer Law — Revue Européenne de Droit de la Consommation 383, 403–406.
81. Brussels Business Tribunal (Belgium, in French), TRB v Uber, 16.1.2019, unpublished (on
file with the authors).
82. See n 8.
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the question was raised before American judges as to whether the French judgment
was to be recognised in the United States.83 In a more recent case, Microsoft faced
legitimacy issues when abiding with an executive order in the US (a subpoena) to
produce data hosted on a server in Ireland. European data protection rules forbade
Microsoft from providing these pieces of information to foreign authorities. These
types of clashes between rules raise legitimacy issues at their core.84 They also illus-
trate the difficult interactions between the scopes of different public norms once
private actors have to comply with them across several jurisdictions. This leads to
questions about finding principles, techniques or concepts that reach beyond the tradi-
tional public–private boundaries.
Second, platforms can also enjoy discretionary power in terms of rule-making85 or
in order to proceed to the legal characterisation of some incidents. Issues then become
even more complex. Debates on the legitimacy of delegating power to private actors
are not novel. Black86 and Ofcom87 have, for instance, long discussed the forms under
which delegation can take place. This forms a kind of ‘continuum’ going from strict
mandated delegation to discretionary self-regulation without State involvement.88
However, many of the successful examples of co-regulation cited in the literature
rely on delegating decision-making to bodies (ie entities composed of a series of pri-
vate actors with at least some form of competitive interests between them, thus poten-
tially allowing for at least minimal external oversight or constraints over unilateral
power).89 Regulation delegated directly to social networks or online gaming platforms
seems scarce and an underexplored path.90 Delegation of standards setting and enfor-
cement to private consortia can be problematic.91 Delegation to digital platforms can
be even more problematic. For instance, Uber enjoys discretion in establishing whether
drivers are deemed to be ‘fit to drive’ in London. This leads to risks of creating dis-
crepancies and discrimination amongst market actors.92 Indeed, the criterion taken into
consideration by a platform in such a situation is more likely to be one of efficiency
than of skills, expertise or experience.93
A sanction can thus legitimately be questioned: how fair was the sanction? What is
algorithmically decided? Was it a man-made decision? What are the actual grounds for
this sanction? Has it been checked for factual accuracy in any way? To answer these
questions, it is necessary to turn to administrative law (especially transparency and the
83. Reed (n 3) 30–33.
84. Andrew Woods, ‘Against Data Exceptionalism’ (2016) 68 Stanford Law Review 729.
85. See above discussion under Section 3.1.
86. Julia Black, ‘Constitutionalising Self-Regulation’ (1996) 59 MLR 24.
87. Ofcom, ‘Online Protection: A Survey of Consumer, Industry and Regulatory Mechanisms
and Systems’ (21 June 2006) <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-and-data/internet-and-on-
demand-research/internet-use-and-attitudes/online-protection> accessed 22 July 2019, 12.
88. Marsden (n 59) 51–62.
89. Ibid 38–43.
90. Ibid 38–39.
91. For a discussion of some problems, see Mariolina Eliantonio, ‘Private Actors, Public
Authorities and the Relevance of Public Law in the Process of European Standardization’
(2018) 24 European Public Law 473.
92. Enguerrand Marique and Yseult Marique, ‘Uber in London: A Battle Between Public and
Private Regulation’ in David Renders and Rozen Noguellou (eds), Uber and Taxis: Comparative
Law Studies (Bruylant, Brussels 2018) 163–200, 175 and 177–178.
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duty to give reasons) so as to ensure that a decision is (1) legitimate and (2) subject to
judicial review.94
3.2.2 Platform operators’ discretion
Last but not least, sanctions can be imposed by platforms for policies which are fully
self-regulated and do not implement any statutory law. Many activities in the digital
space are left for self-governance by private actors. Moreover, many design mechan-
isms compel users’ behaviours and do not leave any leeway to misbehave. Hence, no
sanction is really set up: users’ individual freedom is limited to opt-in/opt-out.
However, one may want to be mindful that practices which would seem to fall within
the reach of self-regulation may not in fact have clear hard law underpinning them. For
instance, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is often
thought of as constituting a wholly private entity having completely autonomous self-
regulation with regards to allocation of domain names. Yet a closer look at the activ-
ities of the ICANN shows that it is under the supervisory authority of governments
(despite some oversight changes in 2016). Additionally, regulation of domain names
has been largely left to States. For instance, the USA has voted the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,95 while many other countries also
have their own equivalent rules.96 Despite the absence of statutory rules in the
United Kingdom, the latter resorts to traditional tort law before the traditional court
system when someone cybersquats (ie registers unduly an internet domain name pro-
tected by a trademark held by a third party) and requires that the domain name be
handed over to the legitimate owner.97 In these cases, the situation is then similar to
the one analysed in the previous subsection.
This section is more devoted to situations where there is no direct or indirect leg-
islation or delegation of enforcement to platforms. This can be the case when ToS
solely apply. Two examples of such rules illustrate legitimacy issues arising from
these situations. First, the prohibition, by Facebook, of publishing artistic nudes
(eg a naked Venus) in France,98 Switzerland99 or Belgium100 has been understood
as a limitation on freedom of expression, while some violent and graphic content is
94. This argument is also supported by A G Szpunar’s opinion in the CJEU case Airbnb
Ireland, where he discusses the ‘power of administrative control’ that some platforms have
(C-390/18, 30 April 2019, [75]–[76]) (ECLI:EU:C:2019:336).
95. 15 USC, §1125(d), also known as the ACPA.
96. Belgian Code for Economic Law, art XII.22; French Postal and Electronic
Communications Code, art L45.2.
97. British Telecommunications Plc & Ors v One in A Million Ltd & Ors [1998] EWCA Civ
1272 (23 July 1998).
98. AFP Paris, ‘Facebook to French Court: Nude Painting did not Prompt Account’s Deletion’,
The Guardian (London, 1 February 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/feb/
01/facebook-nude-painting-gustave-courbet> accessed 22 July 2019.
99. Associate Press, ‘Swiss Museum Laments Facebook Ban of Images of Naked Statues’,
Courthouse News Service (Pasadena, 4 February 2019) <https://www.courthousenews.com/
swiss-museum-laments-facebook-ban-of-images-of-naked-statues/> accessed 26 July 2019.
100. James Crisp, ‘Belgian Museums Urge Facebook to Allow Artistic Nudes in Advertising
after Rubens Falls Foul of Censors’, The Telegraph (London, 23 July 2018) <https://www.tele
graph.co.uk/news/2018/07/23/flemish-museums-urge-facebook-allow-artistic-nudes-advertis
ing/> accessed 22 July 2019.
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merely covered with a warning.101 Second, Uber has sanctioned drivers who repeat-
edly refuse rides by deactivating them for short periods of time.102 It has also excluded
users for inappropriate ratings. At the micro level this means users endure an accumu-
lated number of small ‘reputational sanctions’ by a community (not by platform opera-
tors themselves) which end up in a final sanction of exclusion by platform operators (at
the macro level). These reputational sanctions can, however, be the result of a collec-
tion of discrimination biases,103 leading to questions about how these sanctions can be
monitored/reviewed/kept under control (eg checking if they are based on accurate facts
or acceptable reasons, etc.).
According to Belli and Venturini, sanctions should be subject to due process
requirements. However, they are often imposed without notice or possible appeal
and limits are imposed on the right to freedom of expression.104 Publicity and trans-
parency can also be important factors in assessing the legitimacy of sanctions. Here
ICANN can be mentioned. Despite its private nature, and its private system of dispute
resolution, most decisions under the Uniform Domain-name Dispute-Resolution
Mechanism (UDRP) are made accessible to the wider public – which can ensure
more consistency and transparency against discrimination.105 Incrementally, some
yardsticks seem to become acceptable for assessing the legitimacy of sanctions
imposed by platform operators when sanctions originated at their very discretion.
Would it be possible to identify overarching principles applicable to sanctions imposed
in the digital space?
3.3 Procedural legitimacy
The processes followed to impose sanctions contribute strongly to assessing the legiti-
macy of their outcomes. Under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR),
basic principles connected to a fair trial have been deemed to apply to non-State actors,
such as disciplinary bodies of self-regulated professions. For instance, in the Le
Compte case,106 the professional body regulating the medical profession in Belgium
imposed sanctions against some of its members (suspending them). The suspended
doctors appealed against the decision, first to the professional body itself and then
101. Facebook Community Standards, ‘12. Violence and Graphic Content’ <https://www.face
book.com/communitystandards/graphic_violence> accessed 22 July 2019; see also Facebook
Community Standards, ‘13. Violence and Graphic Content’ <https://perma.cc/KZ39-CZUA>
accessed 22 July 2019.
102. Jeremias Prassl, Humans as a Service: The Promise and Perils of Work in the Gig
Economy (OUP, Oxford 2018) 56 and footnote 22.
103. Ibid 62.
104. Jamila Venturini, Luiza Louzada, Marilia Maciel et al, Terms of Service and Human
Rights: An Analysis of Online Platform Contracts (Editora Revan, Rio de Janeiro 2016)
29–39, 53–59, 65, 84 and 96–103.
105. See however M Scott Donahey, ‘Divergence in the UDRP and the Need for Appellate
Review’ (2002) 5 Journal of Internet Law 1.
106. Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium App no 6878/75, 7328/75 (ECtHR
23 June 1981), extending the reach of art 6 ECHR to disciplinary actions undertaken by profes-
sional organisations (Frédéric Sudre (ed), Les Grands Arrêts de la Cour Européenne des Droits
de l’Homme (8th edn, PUF, Paris 2017) 245–252); Albert and Le Compte v Belgium App no
7299/75, 7496/76 (ECtHR 10 February 1983 Grand Chamber). This remains a landmark case
in this field (see eg Arman Zrvandyan, Casebook on European Fair Trial Standards in
Administrative Justice (Council of Europe – Folke Bernadotte Academy 2016) 28).
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to the Belgian Court of Cassation.107 They then went to Strasbourg, complaining that
Article 6 ECHR had not been complied with. The Strasbourg court decided that these
types of disputes pertained to civil rights, so the guarantees resulting from Article 6
should be complied with (especially publicity). Platforms behave as modern self-
regulating bodies and their decisions impact the civil rights and patrimonial and
extra-patrimonial positions (eg advantages) of users. It thus seems that similar guaran-
tees to the ones offered by Article 6 should also be offered when sanctions result from
digital transactions and offending – at least when these transactions fall within the jur-
isdictions of Council of Europe Member States.
In practice, there is little systematic research available pertaining to the actual pro-
cesses followed by platforms in imposing sanctions and offering procedural guarantees
to users. However, anecdotal evidence shows that concern for them does exist. For
instance, dispute resolution on Alibaba is based on a jury system or a human customer
service representative. Yet 99% of disputes are resolved by negotiation, and hence
without any human intervention. This is due partly to the fact that reducing human
intervention on the platform is seen as a way to limit the reputational risks of bias.
Jury members (who are volunteers) receive a reputation increase on the platform.
This leads to a so-called ‘scored society’.108 Similarly, Uber drivers who are excluded
because of their low ratings109 can lodge an appeal to an internal110 or external111 body
of peers, which reviews the exclusion. Similarly, YouTube content ID claims follow a
procedure which resolves disputes over the attribution of content. A copyright holder
requires that the content uploaded becomes attributed to her/him. Such a procedure
does not necessarily lead to the removal of the content but sometimes merely leads
to attribution of revenue to the copyright holder.112 It can be subject to a dispute
and an appeal process.113 YouTube’s copyright strikes, potentially leading to account
removal, can also be challenged.114
4 TOWARDS ALTERNATIVES BEYOND THE PUBLIC–PRIVATE DIVIDE?
Sanctions on digital platforms call for the attention of international law. They can
make issues arise when it comes to possible conflicts in States’ use of their sovereign
powers outside their jurisdictions. Platform operators may also have to organise spe-
cific procedures and/or entities when they impose sanctions to police behaviours. This
may fall under the umbrella of global administrative law, for instance. Other issues
arising from conflicts of law between actors, users and platforms connected to different
107. Highest court of the judicial order.
108. Katsh and Rabinovich-Einy (n 38) 65–66.
109. O’Connor v Uber Technologies, Inc., 82 F. Supp.3d 1133, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
110. Travis, ‘Growing and Growing Up’, Uber Newsroom (21 April 2016) <https://www.uber.
com/newsroom/growing-and-growing-up/> accessed 22 July 2019.
111. Independent Drivers Guild, ‘Deactivation Appeals Panel’ <https://drivingguild.org/uber-
deactivated/> accessed 22 July 2019.
112. Aide YouTube, ‘Qu’est-ce Qu’une Revendication Content ID ?’ <https://support.google.
com/youtube/answer/6013276> (FR) accessed 22 July 2019.
113. Aide YouTube, ‘Contester une revendication Content ID’ <https://support.google.com/
youtube/answer/2797454> (FR) accessed 22 July 2019.
114. Aide YouTube, ‘Principes de Base des Avertissements pour Atteinte aux Droits d’Auteur’
<https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2814000> (FR) accessed 22 July 2019.
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legal systems require solutions addressed by private international law.115 From these
different factual circumstances, normative pluralism may ensue. This may also lead
to a patchwork of possible sources of legal solutions, lacking clarity and coherence,
transparency and accessibility. This can be a source of confusion for all actors
involved in the digital space. Hence, alternatives to the traditional frameworks for reg-
ulating sanctions have to be considered.
One possible solution would be to include stakeholders and professionals in the
definition of rules, enforcement and litigation pertaining to sanctions imposed in the
digital space. These stakeholders and professionals form the backbones of epistemic
communities and expertise in online rule-making and sanctions. Such involvement
of epistemic communities in transnational governance has been discussed else-
where.116 Paying special attention to all actors, including less powerful ones, should
be considered. Platform operators cannot be trusted to guarantee such extensive inclu-
sion. An external agency could be entrusted with oversight, if not regulatory,
powers.117 Although the specific layout of this external agency would deserve more
extended analysis, this paper would argue in a preliminary way that a hybrid form
would be appropriate on the basis of current available experiences which could be
built on.
Examples of these available experiences can be found in relation to the inclusion of
stakeholders in participatory governance arrangements. Consumer collective bargain-
ing agreements are a first instance of such participation. They have been developed in
France, the UK and the Netherlands to promote fair contractual terms when consumers
are involved. They are agreed upon sector-by-sector by an equal number of represen-
tatives of enterprises and consumer associations. They are binding for the given sec-
tor.118 A second instance of (limited) participatory governance arrangements is found
in standard terms,119 which increase the transparency and thus the awareness of
users.120 A third instance pertains to the political movement of ‘platform cooperati-
vism’, which suggests that users, both consumers and content-providers, should
become shareholders of platforms and operate them. They would benefit from reven-
ues but also from voting power in a general assembly that would govern a platform.121
115. For a discussion about authority in this context, if not about sanctions, see Horatia Muir
Watt, ‘Theorizing Transnational Authority: A Private International Law Perspective’ in Roger
Cotterrell and Maksymilian del Mar (eds), Authority in Transnational Legal Theory:
Theorising Across Disciplines (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2016) 325.
116. Sigrid Quack, ‘Expertise and Authority in Transnational Governance’ in Roger Cotterrell
and Maksymilian del Mar (eds), Authority in Transnational Legal Theory: Theorising Across
Disciplines (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2016) 361.
117. Rory Van Loo, ‘The Corporation as Courthouse’ (2016) 33 Yale Journal on Regulation
548, 584–591.
118. Jong-Youn Rha and Richard Widdows, ‘The Internet and the Consumer: Countervailing
Power Revisited’ (2002) 20 Prometheus 107; Paul Nihoul, ‘Projet de loi Relative aux
Accords Collectifs de la Consommation, Présenté par le Ministre de la Protection de la
Consommation et le Ministre de l’Economie’ (2003) 1 Droit de la Consommation –
Consumentenrecht 89.
119. Bygrave (n 78) 145–147.
120. Momberg (n 31) 198–204.
121. Trebor Scholz, Platform Cooperativism: Challenging the Corporate Sharing Economy
(Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, New York 2016); Trebor Scholz and Nathan Schneider, Ours to
Hack and to Own: The Rise of Platform Cooperativism, A New Vision for the Future of
Work and a Fairer Internet (OR Books, New York 2016).
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Examples of these available experiences building on hybrid public–private solu-
tions pertain also to decision-making and sanctioning. For instance, as this research
has shown, reviews of sanctions by peers, with disciplinary council protection,
could promote participation and inclusion in digital platforms. Additionally, reputation
and feedback-based systems allow for forming an aggregate sanction, as users with
low ratings lose opportunities for transactions. Last but not least, as in the UDRP,
all decisions made by private actors should be made public, so as to support consis-
tency and participation in decision-making. This would also support users’ knowledge
of appropriate expectations about a platform. Decisions and appeal processes should
not be treated as trade secrets, as things currently stand.122
5 CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR FUTURE SANCTIONS ON PLATFORMS
Against a background of extensive literature examining how digital platforms are regu-
lated through ‘soft’ mechanisms, this paper has argued that ‘hard law’ techniques, such
as sanctions, are also very much used on digital platforms to police undesirable beha-
viours. It illustrated the use of these sanctions, suggesting that it is possible to find
three different categories of sanctions: sanctions that find their source in hard (interna-
tional and domestic) law, sanctions that find their sources in digital platforms’ own
normative production, and sanctions used in the course of litigation. Platform operators
can have a very intense power of norm-setting and sanctions, with a tendency to con-
centrate power within themselves or unclear arrangements for dividing it across differ-
ent entities. Yet this only applies to a small slice of users’ lives: users retain their
freedom in other respects. Regulatory competition between platforms may also
allow for some checks and balances and self-limitation in the ways in which platforms
set norms and enforce them. Things become trickier when platforms develop into enti-
ties able to reach broader slices of their users’ lives, as has been the case for Uber in
relation to the professional livelihood it provides to its drivers. In this case, platforms
can develop behaviours deeply affecting individual freedoms.
This has led this paper to suggest that the ways in which the power to set, decide
and enforce sanctions in the digital space transform the public–private divide, ie the
allocation of roles between sovereign public bodies and free private actors is reshaped
to become ‘hybrid’ when it comes to enforcing rules and monitoring compliance
through a wide range of sanctions on digital platforms. Once the use and the diversity
of these sanctions is plainly accepted it is then possible to start analysing the legal
issues arising from these sanctions on digital platforms. This paper has sought to
frame these issues under the overarching concept of their ‘legitimacy’ or the legal con-
ditions under which sanctions are imposed. Legitimacy questions may arise in the
ways in which norms setting sanctions are adopted, in the sanctioning of specific beha-
viour or in the procedures digital platforms follow when they impose sanctions.
Three main issues can be identified in this analysis for further discussion. The first
one pertains to the discretion that platforms enjoy in sanctioning behaviour, discretion
which is very minimally constrained by either procedures or substantive principles, as
self-regulation mainly applies. The second one pertains to the possible ways in which
this discretion may be structured and subject to some form of control. Current scholar-
ship discusses, in this respect, how the proportionality principle may be relied on.123
122. Van Loo (n 117) 601.
123. Mart Susi, ‘The Internet Balancing Formula’ (2019) 25 European Law Journal 198.
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The third issue pertains to the vacuum in finding a source of legitimacy for the power
that digital platforms exercise over individual freedoms. This paper has suggested that
the public–private divide may have to be bridged in order to locate a possible source of
legitimacy. As digital platforms indeed embody mixed forms of public and economic
powers,124 it may be that new forms of legitimacy may develop based on public–
private interactions. This is possibly a political choice that needs to be agreed upon
by all actors, from the more powerful to the less powerful ones, from the more
State-like to the more private-like ones, including businesses operating mainly in
the physical world as they are also interested in what happens in the digital space.
For these reasons, the transnational nature of digital platforms calls for international
public–private cooperation to address the hybridity of power in enforcement regimes:
leading either to extending public–private participation in setting sanctions in the digi-
tal space or to setting up hybrid institutions to address the excesses to which sovereign
platforms may be exposed. A future framework for assessing how platform operators
set norms and ensure compliance through sanctions may need to start from individual
users to see how best to protect their freedom when checks and balances around plat-
forms’ powers and sanctions are developed. The transnational public–private hybrids
that platforms are becoming should not conceal who should be truly at the core of
law’s concern: third (public and private) parties affected by sanctions imposed in
the digital space, and vulnerable parties, very much rooted in the physical world
and possibly tricked into giving away their freedom under the cover of ‘digital self-
fulfilment’. These are the ones who may suffer the economic, social and reputational
consequences of sanctions in both the digital and physical worlds.
124. Enguerrand Marique and Yseult Marique, ‘Beyond the Public and Private Divide on
Digital Platforms? Revisiting Power Relationships’ in Elisabetta Bani, Edyta Rutkowska-
Tomaszewska and Beata Pachuca-Smulska (eds), Public Law and the Challenges of New
Technologies and Digital Markets (CH Beck, Warsaw 2019, forthcoming).
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